June 23, 2008

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT ALLOWS INJURED PARTIES TO RECOVER FULL REASONABLE VALUE OF MEDICAL EXPENSES

The Illinois Supreme Court recently clarified exactly what injured parties may claim as medical expenses in injury cases. The opinion, Wills v. Foster, was issued on June 19, 2008. The underlying facts are pretty straightforward. The plaintiff, Sheila Wills was injured in an automobile collision. She sued the defendant, Inman E. Foster. Ms. Wills had medical bills of $80,163.47. In addition, plaintiff was covered by both Medicaid and Medicare. As a result, her medical bills were directed to Medicaid and/or Medicare, who paid a fraction of the actual billed amount - $19005.50 to be exact.

Prior to trial the plaintiff moved to exclude any evidence that Medicaid/Medicare had paid any of her bills. At the same time, the defendant moved that plaintiff be allowed to claim only the actual paid amount of the bills, as opposed to the billed amount. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defense motion. The case then proceeded to trial. The jury found for plaintiff and awarded her the full amount of her actual medical bills[$80,163.47], as well as an additional amount for pain and suffering. The defense then filed a post-trial motion, asking the court to reduce the medical bill portion of the verdict from $80,163.47 to $19,005.50. The trial court granted the defense motion and reduced the plaintiff's award to the actual amount that Medicare and Medicaid had paid. The plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Appellate District Court. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Plaintiff argued that the trial court's order violated the collateral source doctrine and was contrary to Arthur v. Catour, another recent Illinois Supreme Court decision. The collateral source doctrine basically provides that injured parties shouldn't be punished for receiving collateral source[i.e. insurance company]payments of medical bills incurred due to the negligence of others. Juries are not to be informed that a) the plaintiff was covered by insurance or b) that insurance made any payments on the plaintiff's behalf. [As an aside this fiction is somewhat outdated - most juries know there is insurance involved]. The Arthur v. Catour decision had held that a plaintiff could submit unpaid medical bills to the jury if there was sufficent foundation testimony that the bill involved was reasonable.

The Supreme Court, after much discussion, decided that the Arthur v. Catour approach was correct. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek to recover the full reasonable value of their medical expenses. The "reasonableness" requirement set forth in Arthur remains a part of the foundational requirement in order to get the bill into evidence. A paid medical bill will be presumed to be reasonable, and therefore, admissible. In order to get unpaid portions of medical bills submitted to the jury, the plaintiff will be required to present evidence[presumably testimony from an individual familiar with medical coding and billing]that the unpaid portions of the bill are indeed reasonable. The defendant is free to cross examine any witness called by plaintff to establish reasonableness and the defendant can call his own witness to offer testimony the bill was not reasonable. Defendants may NOT however, introduce evidence that the bill in question was compromised for a lesser amount. Once a bill is submitted to the jury, the jury decides if they will award all, some of none of it.

June 20, 2008

SEX ABUSE CRISIS RAGES IN VERMONT

The story that just won't go away.


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Various news agencies carried stories on Friday about the Catholic priest sex abuse scandal that is currently rocking Vermont. In May, a jury heard allegations from a former Vermont altar boy that he was abused repeatedly by Rev. Edward Paquette in the 1970s. The jury awarded the plaintiff, now in his 40's, $8.7 million dollars. The defendant, Fr. Paquette, had admitted in a 2006 deposition that he had been "sexually involved" with young boys at parishese in Indiana and Massachusetts before he applying for a position with the Burlington, Vermont Diocese in 1972. At the time, Fr. Paquette indicated he wanted to be closer to his parents, who lived in Massachusetts.

When Paquette applied for the Vermont position, Bishop Loe Pursley of the Fort Waye, Indiana Diocese advised Vermont Bishop John Marshall that Paquette had been accused of molesting young boys. Pursley further suggested that if the Vermont Diocese decided to take Paquette, he should be assigned to an institutional chaplaincy or a senior center, so he wouldn't be around children. [Documents reflecting Pursley's concerns were admitted as evidence in the trial] The Vermont Diocese however, elected to ignore that warning and assigned him to three parishes in Vermont. Paquette was subsequently accused of abusing children at each of those three parishes.

According to the victim in the recent trial, Paquette liked giving "pony rides" to the altar boys after mass. He would grope his young victims during the rides. The victim testified he was abused some 40-100 times. The victim had kept quiet for years, but decided to come forward after learning of Paquette's history and the warnings from the Indiana Diocese.

Church officials have defended their handling of abuse claims in the 1970s by claiming that at the time, it was believed that prayer and counseling would cure priests of their attraction to little boys. It is not made clear who exactly thought that prayer would cure these perverts.

In another pathetic development, the Vermont Diocese is claiming that the verdict is covered by insurance...but they just can't find the policy. No doubt they could find all kind of ancient documents damning divorce for example, but they misplaced the policy covering them for abusing children.

In yet another pathetic development, it was revealed that the Diocese had put each individual parish under charitable trusts two years ago, to shield them from what Bishop Salvatore Matano called "unbridled, unjust and terribly unreasonable assault." So the Church has elected to blame not the twisted individuals who preyed upon children, but the persons who are now seeking recovery for years of abuse.

At least three additional lawsuits are scheduled to begin in August.

June 18, 2008

ILLINOIS HAS A FIVE DAY NOTICE FOR INJURY CASES

Illinois personal injury lawyers have their own version of the Five Day Notice.

Pursuant to 815 ILCS 640/1, the Personal Injury Representation Agreement Act, any plaintiff who retains counsel to represent him/her in a personal injury case, WITHIN 5 DAYS OF THE INCIDENT, may, within 10 days after the occurrence, avoid the contract by notifying the attorney, in writing of the decision to terminate the contract, via certified or regular mail.

In addition, the attorney who signs a client up within 5 days of the event leading to the injury must provide to that client a copy of the contract; an address to which the notice avoiding the contract may be sent; a copy of the Act and a written acknowledgement of receipt from the plaintiff. In addition, the 10 day period does not begin to run until the lawyer provides the documents noted.

According to the legislative history, the Act is designed to shield recently injured parties who hastily sign legal contracts without due consideration of all the relevent facts.

I have been practicing for over 2 decades and was completely unaware of this Act. So you may indeed learn something new every day.

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June 17, 2008

E. COLI DEADLY - EVEN IF NOT EATEN!

The Chicago Sun Times reported Monday on the tragic story of a 3 year old girl who died as a result of E. Coli poisoning - even though she had not ingested the tainted meat. The child, Brianna Kriefall, had eaten with her family at a Sizzler Restuarant in South Milwaukee, Wiconsin, sometime in 2000. Brianna didn't eat any of the tainted meat, but her lawyers argued she became sick after eating watermelon that had been tainted by the meat. The little girl died just a week after being exposed. Brianna's lawyers secured a $13.5 million dollar settlement from Sizzler's meat supplier, as well as other defendants.

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June 5, 2008

SUPREME COURT BANS RETALIATION UNDER SECTION 1981

The United States Supreme Court recently struck a blow for those employees who claim they were retaliated against after complaining of racial discrimination at their workplace. The case, CBOCS[Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores]West v. Humphries, arose out of treatment the plaintiff, Hedrick Humphries endured at an Illinios Cracker Barrel Restuarant. Humphries worked there for nearly three years as an assistant manager. He alleged that he was fired after he complained about allegedly discriminatory disciplinary action taken against him and another black employee. In addition, he had complained about allegedly racist remarks made by another manager. Humphries filed a lawsuit under 42 USC 1981, claiming both discrimination and retaliation. [Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination, but does not specifically mention retaliation]. Cracker Barrel argued that since Section 1981 doesn't specifically outlaw retaliation, no cause of action for retaliation existed under the statute. Not suprisingly, business groups across the United States, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supported Cracker Barrel. The trial judge agreed with Cracker Barrel and both the retaliation claim and discrimination claim were dismissed. Humphries elected to appeal only the dismissal of the retaliation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 provides a cause of action for retaliation. Cracker Barrel then appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, but to no avail. On June 3, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that that Section 1981 does indeed provide a cause of action for retaliation following complaints about discrimination on the basis of race. As noted by Cynthia Hyndman, Humphries attorney, the decision "...allows workers and contracting parties to go and say 'you're discriminating against me on the basis of race, and this isn't right, let's fix it' without fear of losing their job".